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Abstract
VAR analysis on a measure of bank lending standards collected by the Federal Reserve reveals 
that shocks to lending standards are significantly correlated with innovations in commercial 
loans at banks and in real output.  Credit standards strongly dominate loan rates in explaining 
variation in business loans and output. Standards remain significant when we include various 
proxies for loan demand, suggesting that part of the standards fluctuations can be identified with 
changes in loan supply.  Standards are also significant in structural equations of some categories 
of inventory investment, a GDP component closely associated with bank lending.  The estimated 
impact of a moderate tightening of standards on inventory investment is of the same order of 
magnitude as the decline in inventory investment over the typical recession.    
1 Lown: Former Research Officer at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY).  
Morgan is Senior Economist at FRBNY.  The views of the authors do not necessarily represent 
those of the FRBNY or of the Federal Reserve System.  We thank Tom Brady, Bill Nelson, Bill 
English, Ken Kuttner, Jonathan McCarthy, and Egon Zakrajsek for their comments, and Sonali 
Rohatgi, Amir Sufi, and Shana Wang for research assistance.  2
I. Introduction
For most of the last 35 years, economists at the Federal Reserve have asked  
a sample of loan officers at large U.S. banks some version of the following question:   
Over the past three months, how have your bank’s credit standards for approving 
 loan applications for C&I loans or credit lines—excluding those to finance mergers  
and acquisitions—changed?  1) Tightened considerably 2) tightened somewhat  
3) remained basically unchanged 4) eased somewhat 5) eased considerably.   
Lenders’ responses to the question on standards—the net percent reporting tightening 
standards—are plotted in Chart 1.   Note the gap in series between 1984 and 1990, when the 
question was not put to lenders.  Observe that tighter standards are usually followed by slower 
commercial loan growth, and that all but one recession were preceded by a sharp tightening in 
standards.
This paper investigates the correlation between these reported changes in standards and 
the subsequent fluctuations in lending and spending.  Along the way, we investigate several 
long-standing macroeconomic questions.  To what extent do bankers allocate business loans by 
changing standards as opposed to changing loan rates?   How does economic activity depend on 
credit “availability,” and vice-versa?  These seemingly old-fashioned questions are actually close 
cousins of modern research on financial market frictions and their role in business fluctuations.  
The same sorts of informational frictions that give rise to bank lending or balance sheets effects 
stressed in the latest generation of literature can also cause the credit rationing and availability 
effects emphasized in the previous generation.  The language and models have evolved, but the 
issues are fundamentally similar.  In brief, this paper maintains that the frictions central to both 
literatures are manifest in credit standards reported by commercial loan officers to the Federal 
Reserve over the last 35 years.  Studying those standards should tell us something about the 
existence of such frictions, and their role in the business cycle.3
We treat credit standards as an  endogenous variable in a small vector auto 
regression (VAR) that controls for recent macro and monetary conditions.  Even with standards 
ordered last in the VAR—the most conservative ordering—we find that shocks to standards 
account for most of the variance decomposition in business lending, far more than are accounted 
for bank loan spreads.  Innovations in standards also account for a sizable share of the variance 
decomposition of output.  Standards are still significant when we add various proxies for 
commercial credit quality and demand (business failures) and forward looking variables 
(forecasted GDP and interest rate spreads).  To get some sense of the economic magnitudes 
involved here, we add the standard series to a structural equation for inventory investment, an 
especially volatile spending component that is closely linked to bank lending.  Tightenings in 
standards are a significant drag on retail and wholesale inventory investment (though not 
manufacturing).  Estimates from the former equations imply that even a moderate tightening in 
standards—only about half as large as the typical pre-recession spike in Chart 1—slows the rate 
of inventory investment by the same order of magnitude as the overall decline in spending during 
the typical recession.
II. The Meaning of “Standards”
We use “standards” to refer to any of the various non-price lending terms specified in the 
typical bank business loan or line of credit: collateral, covenants, loan limits, etc.  One goal here 
is to show that the standards series in this paper makes for a reasonable index for the full vector 
of non-price lending terms.  Our concept of standards is closely tied to the informational frictions 
that occupy so much of the modern literature on credit markets.  If lenders and borrowers have 
the same information about the credit risk in a transaction, the risk gets priced and allocated like 
any other good (or bad)—by price.   With asymmetric information, credit gets elevated from a 4
simple quantity-price commodity to a more  complicated loan contract with detailed non-
price terms.    
The notion that the “price” of credit is a vector of terms (not just a simple scalar) goes 
back some ways in the literature:
A recurrent theme in the literature and among market participants is that the interest
alone does not adequately reflect the links between financial markets and the rest of  
the economy.  Rather, it is argued, the availability credit and the quality of balance  
sheets are important determinants of the rate of investment (Blanchard and Fischer, p. 478)
 Proponents of the “availability doctrine” in 1950s maintained that monetary policy 
operated more through changes in the “availability” of credit than through changes in rates 
(Roosa 1951), although they failed to explain why a lender would operate that way (except when 
constrained by interest rate ceilings).   Keeton (1979), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and Williamson 
(1986) showed that “quantity rationing” can result endogenously in a variety of models where 
credit quality varies inversely with the level of interest rates (because of adverse selection or 
moral hazard among borrowers).  Bernanke and Gertler (1989) argue that these frictions wax and 
wane over the course of the business cycle; improved balance sheets during booms induce 
lenders to ease credit terms, and easier terms prolong the expansion.  
Our paper is not strictly a test of any of these models.  We invoke them here simply to 
establish the possibility that credit conditions warrant attention as a possible factor in business 
fluctuations.  Credit conditions are not just passive reflections of fundamental economic 
conditions as in a classical model, but rather the credit cycle can influence the course of the 
business cycle.
III. Measuring Standards
The Federal Reserve collects information on bank credit standards in its Senior Loan 5
Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending  Practices, a quarterly survey of major banks 
around the country. The number of participating banks has declined (along with the number of 
U.S. banking firms in the industry) from about 120 banks in the early years of the survey to 
roughly 60 today.  Participants are typically the largest in their district, and are expected to have 
a sizable share of business loans in their portfolio.  In aggregate, participating banks account for 
about 60 percent of all loans by U.S. banks and about 70 percent of all U.S. bank business loans. 
Questionnaires are transmitted via fax or telephone to participating loan officers by Federal 
Reserve economists in each district, who check responses, follow up as necessary, then transmit 
completed surveys back to the Federal Reserve Board economists for tabulation.  The response 
rate is virtually 100 percent.
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Minor diction changes in the question on standards (p. 1) over the years necessitated 
some splicing to come up with a single series.  Starting in 1978, when the prime loan rate 
emerged as an important benchmark, loan officers were asked to report separately on standards 
for loans made at prime rate and for loans at above prime.  For that period (1978-84), our series 
is the average of the responses to the two questions.   The question was dropped from the survey 
in 1984.  Bank interest rates were deregulated about the same time.  With unfettered rates, Board 
decision makers may have reasoned that non-price terms, like standards, would matter less in the 
2 Banks are added or replaced as needed, mostly because of mergers between participating banks. The Federal 
Reserve also conducts occasional ad hoc surveys when market events seem to warrant.   We limit our study to data 
from the regular survey only. The Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey comprised a fixed set of 22 questions from its 
inception in 1964 until 1981.  At that time, all but six of those questions were dropped from the survey to make room 
for more ad hoc questions on emerging developments.  In 1984, five of the remaining six core questions were 
dropped, including the question above.  Our spliced series on C&I standards can be found at 
http://www.ny.frb.org/rmaghome/economist/morgan/pubs.html (click on Standards). Recent survey results can be 
found at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SnLoanSurvey/.6
loan allocation process (Schreft 1991).
3   The  question was reinstated in 1990:2 in response to 
concerns about a commercial lending crunch. Since then, lenders have reported separately on 
standards for small and standards for larger firms; we use the latter, but the 0.96 correlation 
between the series makes that choice irrelevant.  
The resulting series plotted in Chart 1 is a net percent tightening: the number of loan 
officers reporting tightening standards less the number reporting easing divided by the total 
number reporting.
45  Lown, Morgan, and Rohatgi (2000) find that the standards reported by loan 
officers are highly negatively correlated with aggregate commercial loan growth and with 
various measures of economic and business activity.  The VAR analysis here takes up where the 
mostly single-equation methods in Lown et al. (2000) left off.    
IV. VAR Results
The core of our VAR comprises just four variables: log real GDP, log GDP deflator, log 
commodity prices, federal funds rate.  These four variables represent a potentially complete 
macro economy with “supply” (commodity prices) and “demand” (the federal funds rate, output 
and prices.  Versions of this model have been widely used in the macro and monetary literature 
(e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998)).  We 
3 Interest rate constraints may be sufficient to motivate non-price credit allocation, but are not necessary; incentive 
and informational constraints may also lead to such mechanisms. In fact, bank standards did become less volatile 
relative to loan rates after interest rate deregulated (Keeton 1986), suggesting that institutional constraints were part 
of why lenders resorted to non-price mechanisms. 
4  Weighting the responses over the 1990s by the extent of change (somewhat versus considerably) did not change 
the picture or the results, nor did using a diffusion index. Integrating the changes reported by lenders over time did 
not work as well as any of the other measures.  
5 Schreft and Owens (1991) provide an interpretive history of the commercial standards series and note some 
dubious features of the data (e.g., the apparent aversion to reporting easings in early year).  In a series of articles, 
Harris (1973, 1974, 1975) documents a significant, positive correlation between commercial credit standards, loan 
rates and other non-price terms. None of those articles investigates the relationship between standards, lending, and 
output, however. Duca and Garrett (1995) investigate a related series collected by the Federal Reserve on consumer
credit standards. The consumer series is continuous, but its correlation with the commercial series is too low to use it 
to fill the gap in the commercial series.  7
purposely chose an off-the-shelf model in order  to keep attention on the data.   
We model the commercial credit market with just two variables: the volume of 
commercial loans at banks and the net percent of loan officers reporting tightening commercial 
credit standards.  We ordered the credit variables after the macro variables, with standards last, 
and loans second-to-last.  The VARs include four lags each of every variable.  All models were 
estimated over the disjoint time period for which we have standards data 1968:1 - 1984:1 and 
1990:2-2000:2 (see Table 3 for summary statistics).
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Table 1 reports coefficient sums and significance levels for three VARs. The first model 
includes C&I loans, but not standards (left panel). Note that past values of output are significant 
in the loan equation, but loans are insignificant in the output equation.  This confirms the 
familiar result that output “causes” loans (in the VAR sense), but not vice-versa (King 1986; 
Ramey 1993).  Lagged output enters the loan equation with a positive coefficient sum, implying 
a procyclical output-loan correlation.  Note also that loans and the federal funds rate cause one 
another other, although the positive relationship between the two is not necessarily intuitive. 
The second VAR includes standards (middle panel).  Past standards are highly significant 
in the equations for output and loans, with tightening standards associated with lower future 
levels of loans and output.  Note the reverse causality from loans to standards; higher past loan 
levels are associated with tighter, future standards.  Standards and past output are not directly 
related, but there is an indirect link via the positive correlation between past output and loans:
higher output leads to higher loans, hence higher standards.  Controlling for that indirect effect is 
important; otherwise, we confound the indirect, positive effect of past output on standards (via 
6 The Senior Loan Officer Survey is conducted four times per year, but the surveys are not always three months 
apart.  In those events, we matched the January survey with first quarter observations on the other variables, the May 8
loans) with the direct negative effect of a  standards on future output.   We show this by 
simply dropping loans from the VAR (right panel). Without loans, past output appears positively 
correlated with standards and the link from past standards and output is much less negative.
7
Impulse Responses. Chart 2 plots impulse responses and standard error bands (two) for 
the VAR model with loans and standards.
8 The typical standards shock amounts to an 8 percent 
increase in the net fraction tightening, which is significantly different from zero but substantially 
less than observed during the 1990 “crunch.”  The fraction tightening remains significantly 
above zero for about three quarters.  After about nine quarters, lenders commence easing.
9
Loans, output, and the federal funds rate all decline significantly in response to the standards 
shock.  Loans contract almost immediately and continue to decline until bankers start easing 
standards. At the trough, loan volume is about 3 percent lower than before the shock to 
standards.  Output declines significantly in the quarter immediately after the standards shock and 
remains significantly below its initial rate for almost two years.  At its trough, output is about 0.5 
percent lower than before the shock.
10  The federal funds rate also tends to fall after the 
survey with second quarter data, etc.  We use the average of the federal funds rate over the quarter. 
7 Past commodity prices are significant in predicting standards, but not vice-versa. Some of the relationships 
observed in the VAR without standards change when we add standards.   Lagged output predicted loans in the model 
without standards, but not vice-versa.  With standards, the causality goes both ways.  Loans and the federal funds 
rates were positively related in the model without standards, a not entirely sensible result.  With standards, loans and 
the funds are not significantly related. 
8 The standard error bounds were generated using the Monte Carlo integration program provided in RATS V.5, 
2000. See Users Guide (p. 300) and references therein.
9This seesaw effect makes sense, as loan officers are reporting changes in standards.  A change one way requires an 
equal and offsetting change in the other direction to return to the normal level of standards. 
10 Overall, the path of GDP roughly parallels the path of standards.  The decline in GDP becomes insignificantly 
different from zero, for example, at about the same time that standards turn significantly negative (i.e. lenders start 
easing). The paths of GDP and loan volume are not as close, however.  The trough in GDP, for example, clearly 
precedes the low point in loan volume.  GDP includes non-business output, of course, and that activity should not 
necessarily parallel commercial lending. 9
tightening in standards.  The decline becomes  significant about three quarters after the shock, 
by which time the funds rate has been lowered by about 50 basis points.   
Shocks to commodity prices and loans both cause lenders to tighten standards.  
Innovations in loans have a prompt, persistent, and significant impact on standards: a one 
standard deviation increase in the log of loans (about 1.0 percent) increases the net fraction 
tightening by approximately 4.0 percent two quarters later. Shocks to the federal funds rate do 
not affect standards: standards tend upwards after an innovation in the federal funds rate, but the 
response is never significant.
11
Variance Decompositions.  Innovations in standards account for nearly a third of the 
error variance in output at four quarters, even more than is attributable to innovations in the 
federal  funds rate.  Standards shocks account for an even larger share of the errors in loans: 15 
percent at three quarters, and nearly two-thirds at 12 quarters.  The feedback on the loans to 
standards, noted earlier, shows up here too: innovations in loans account for about 20 percent of 
the forecast errors in standards.  Ignoring that feedback by omitting loans reduces the share of 
output shocks attributable to standards shocks to less than ten percent (at most).
12  Shocks to 
standards account for 16 percent of federal funds innovations at the 12-quarter horizon.  In sum, 
these decompositions largely confirm the earlier results: standards are important in accounting 
for loans, output, and the federal funds rate, but only loans matter (directly) in accounting for 
standards.
Robustness. Differencing GDP, the deflator, commodity prices, and loans did not alter 
11  We do not include a loan rate because once we control for standards, loan rates (or spreads) have no additional 
power for explaining loans or output. See Lown and Morgan (2002) find no explanatory role for of standards in the 
monetary transmission more fully. 
12 Ten percent of the innovations in standards are attributable to commodity price shocks (at most). 10
the impulse results in a substantive way, nor  did using 8 instead of 4 lags.  Changes in the 
ordering of the financial variables also did not alter any of our results.  Using industrial 
production rather than real GDP as the output measure actually strengthens the role of standards, 
presumably because of the more direct link between commercial credit standards and production. 
We tested (crudely) for asymmetries in the relationship between standards and output (e.g. 
tightenings matter more than easing) but could not reject symmetry.  
IV.1 Extended VARs
The VAR results thus far indicate a strong statistical link between business lending 
standards, business loans, and economic activity, with tightenings in standards followed by 
contractions in loans and GDP.   While it is tempting to identify the changes in standards with 
changes in bank loan supply, there is an obvious demand side interpretation as well.  Tighter 
standards could signal some other negative disturbance to economic activity that reduces the 
demand for loans at the same time banks tighten standards.  The cutting edge, however, that 
reduces loan quantities might be the reduction in borrower demand rather than any change in 
lending standards.  Sorting out the correct structural interpretation of our VAR results will likely 
require a model.  Short of that, we make some headway on the identification issue here by 
extending the VAR with additional variables that are (arguably) identified with either loan 
demand or supply.   
Our list of proxies, summarized in table 3, is motivated by a mix of theory, findings 
elsewhere in the literature, and the reports of loan officers’ themselves.
13  Expected output is an 
obvious fundamental determinant of credit demand; lower expected output likely implies lower 
13  Since 1990, loan officers that report a change in their commercial credit standards are asked to rank five possible 
reasons for changing standards: economic outlook or uncertainty, expected capital position, more or less tolerance 11
expected returns on investment and hence,  reduced demand for credit.
14  Business failures 
should also serve as reasonable proxy for demand; with high failures indicating diminished 
investment prospects and thus, reduced demand for credit.  The coverage ratio—interest 
payments divided by cash flow—is intended to proxy for credit quality as well.  The commercial 
paper-Treasury bill spread is another forward looking variable, with spikes serving as a (usually) 
reliable signal of future contractions in activity.
15  Capital/asset ratios at banks we included as a 
potential determinant of bank loan supply.
16  We also add a loan rate, or spread, to see which 
variable—standards or loan rates—seems most important in explaining loan levels. The extra 
variables are added one at a time to the VAR, and in the penultimate position (before standards, 
but after every other variable).
Table 4 reports abbreviated sets of exclusion tests for each of the extended VARs.   Even 
with the extra variables in the models, standards remain highly significant in predicting loans 
and output, in fact, most of the extra other variables pale in comparison.  Given standards, lagged 
loan rates are insignificant in predicting output.  Lagged loan rates are significant (by the F-test)
in predicting loan levels, but the sum of coefficients on the lagged loans rates is insignificant.  
Past values of the interest-coverage ratio are marginally significant in predicting real GDP, but 
less so than standards.
for risk, reduced or increased competition from other lenders, changes in specific sectors.
14  A diminished outlook may also reduce the supply of credit, however, if reduced fundamentals aggravate incentive 
problems between banks and borrowers; poorer investment prospects may lead project owners to shirk on current 
undertakings or shift effort and resources toward higher mean risk projects.  Indeed, loan officers consistently rate 
$deterioration or increased uncertainty in the outlook#as the most important reason for tightenings in standards. We 
use the median (across forecasters) of the professional forecasts compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia.  The data are available on that bank s website.
15 Researchers have identified changes in the spreads with changes in monetary policy, increases in the extent of 
information problems, and simply increased risk or decreases risk tolerance.
16In Bernanke and Gertler (1987), for example, capital is an essential determinant of banks  lending capacity; 
adverse capital shocks force banks to substitute safe securities for riskier loans in order to satisfy market imposed 
capital requirements.  Capital is also rated high by loan officers as a reason for changes in standards. 12
Of the extra variables, only the  business failures rate is significant in 
explaining standards.  A higher rate of failures is associated with tightening standards, as one 
would expect.  Given the failure rate, the current change in standards is related to its own past 
changes at only the 10 percent level, indicating that failures absorb some of the impact of lagged 
standards.  Even controlling for the failure rate, however, standards are still highly significant in 
predicting loans and output, while the failure rate is not significant in either equation.
17
We investigated the VAR with the business failure rate in further detail, since this 
variable proved significant in explaining standards.  The impulse responses from the model 
reveal that shocks to the failure rate are followed by a significant tightening in credit standards 
(Chart 3, lower right).  Even after accounting for the effect of failures on standards, however, a 
standards shock still causes output to slow significantly.
18
Innovations in the failure rate account for about 10 percent of the variance decomposition 
of standards.  The share of the variance decomposition of output attributable to innovations in 
standards is lower when the model includes business failures, but still sizable (Table 5).  The 
share attributable to standards increases to about 15 percent at four quarters, and declines 
thereafter.  Similarly, the importance of standards in explaining the variance decomposition of 
lending falls somewhat, but is still quite large: 18 percent at 4 quarters and 28 percent at 8 
quarters.
More on Bank Capital.  Although the predicted negative relationship between standards 
and capital ratios did not materialize in the exclusion tests, the strong theoretical priors for a role 
17 The insignificant relationship between bank capital ratios and standards might partly reflect our use of book 
capital rather than market capital.  We are also missing data for 1984-90, when banks were anticipating tightening 
capital constraints under the Basle Accord.
18 The VAR ordering is standards last and failures second-to-last so the innovation in standards is orthogonal to the 
contemporaneous innovation in failures. 13
of capital motivated further investigation of  this variable in the model.  Examining the 
impulse response and variance decompositions may uncover indirect links between the variables 
via feedback among other variables in the VAR.  In fact, positive shocks to the capital/asset ratio 
are somewhat expansionary in terms of lending standards (Chart 4, lower right).  The response of 
standards is marginally significant (between 5 percent and 10 percent) four quarters after the 
initial shock and for several quarters thereafter.  According to the variance decompositions 
(Table 5), however, shocks to the capital/asset ratio account for only 8 percent of the variance 
decomposition of standards at 8 quarters.  Again, we view this mixed-to-weak result more as a 
problem with using book-value capital series than as evidence against the notion that capital 
positions can sometimes constrain bank lending.
19
In sum, the significance of the business failure rate in explaining credit standards 
provides some support for the idea that standards are altered in response to changes in firms’ 
financial health. The marginal significance of bank capital suggests some role for bank balance 
sheet health as well.  Yet even with the inclusion of these determinants of credit standards, the 
remaining unexplained or exogenous part of standards appears to play a significant role in 
accounting for movements in lending and output.        
The final panel in Table 5 reports the variance decomposition for a VAR including the 
C&I loan rate (in the penultimate position).  Innovations in the loan rate account for only a 
trivial (and insignificant) share of innovations output, loans, and standards.  Innovations in 
standards still account for sizable (and significant) shares of the innovations in output and C&I 
loans, even with the loan rate included in the VAR.   Chart 5 plots selected impulse responses 
19 We have also considered other bank variables such as the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans and an index 
of bank stock prices.  These variables were not significant in explaining standards, nor did they displace standards in 14
from the VAR that includes the loan rate. The  loan rate responds strongly and positively to 
innovations in output.  Shocks to the loan rate cause loans to contract slightly, but the loan 
response is very brief, especially by comparison with the response of loans to a shock in 
standards.
VI. Standards in a Structural Inventory Investment Model 
 We estimate a structural equation for inventory investment and measure the quantitative 
effect of a tightening in standards on inventory investment.  The structural part of the equation is 
intended to explicitly control for inventory investment demand so the coefficients on standards
should measure the quantitative impact of a reduction in the supply of bank credit (via tighter 
standards) on investment.  A similar strategy was used in the exploration of the $mix# variable 
by Kashyap et al. (1993).  Inventory spending makes the ideal laboratory for this examination 
because: a) banks fund a substantial share of inventory investment; b) fluctuations in inventory 
investment figure disproportionately in GDP fluctuations; and c) inventory investment spending 
is curiously insensitive to interest rates (Blinder and Maccini, 1991).  A finding that fluctuations 
in commercial credit standards affect inventory investment may help explain b) and c). 
The inventory investment equation--a simple target adjustment ala Lovell (1961)--is  
similar to the version in Gertler and Gilchrist (1994): 
ǻIt   = Į0   + Į1 (Et-1St - It-1)   +   Į2 rt-1   + Į3STt-1   + Į4ǻIt-1   + Į5ǻ St-1
(1)
+ Į6ǻrt-1   + Į7ǻSTt-1   + İt
where I, S, and ST denote the logs of inventories, sales and loan standards, and r denotes the 
explaining output or loans.15
short-term real interest rate.  The dependent  variable is the inventory growth rate.  
According to the usual model, inventory investment each period depends on the gap between the 
lagged level of inventories and the target level of (expected) sales and on the short-term interest 
rate.  Short-run dynamics are allowed via the lagged differences of all variables.  The difference 
in our equation  is the addition of commercial credit standards on the right hand side.  Given 
inventory investment demand, we expect slower rates of investment when standards have been 
tight.
As is common, we use actual sales in lieu of expected sales on the right hand side.  Since 
current sales are endogenous, we use lagged values of sales and all the other variables (including 
standards) as instruments for current sales.
20  For the real interest rate, we use the prime loan rate 
less the one year inflation rate.  We estimate (1) separately for each category of inventories: 
retail, wholesale, and manufacturing.   For each category, we include the corresponding category 
of sales on the right hand side. 
Table 6 presents the estimates of the inventory investment equations.  Though 
insignificant in the equation for manufacturing, standards are highly significant in the equations 
for trade inventories.
21  We can reject that the standards coefficients are jointly zero in the 
wholesale inventory equation at the 6 percent level.  The irrelevance of standards in the retail 
inventory equation can be rejected at 2 percent.  Excluding standards from the retail inventory 
equation reduces the adjusted R
2 by about half, indicating that fluctuation in standards account 
20Including standards as an instrument eliminates the possible criticism that loan standards are significant in 
explaining inventories because they contain information about expected sales. 
21 We do not know why standards appear irrelevant for manufacturing inventories.  The typical manufacturing firms 
may be larger (than the typical trade firm) and may be less bank-dependent for credit.  Decomposing manufacturing 
inventories (by stage of fabrication) might reveal effects of standards on work-in-progress and raw material 
inventories.16
for about half of the explanatory power of the  retail inventory investment equation. 
The impact of a change in standards on inventory investment in the trade sectors is large 
relative to the normal behavior of those series.  One standard deviation tightening in standards 
(about 19 percentage points) reduces retail inventory investment by 1.5 percentage points per 
year (compared to a mean rate of 3.9 per year; standard deviation of 6.2 percent) and wholesale 
inventory by 1.3 percentage points per year (compared to a mean of 5.2 percent, standard 
deviation of 5.6 percent).  In absolute terms, this tightening would trim trade inventory 
investment on the order of $10 billion.  That number is substantial relative to the $30 billion drop 
in real GDP during the typical recession.  Bear in mind also that the tightening in this experiment 
is gentle relative to the usual 40 percent net tightening before recessions (Chart 1).
VI. Conclusion 
Fluctuations in commercial credit standards are highly significant in predicting 
commercial bank loans, real GDP, and inventory investment in the trade sector.  If standards are 
tightening more than usual (given macro and credit conditions), lower levels of loans and slower 
rates of output can be expected with a high degree of confidence.  Credit standards are far more 
informative about future lending than are loan rates, which is consistent with the idea that some 
sort of friction in lending markets leads lenders to ration loans via changes in standards more 
than through changes in rates.
We hesitate to interpret these correlations as evidence of a causal connection between 
bank loan supply and real activity as tightenings in standards may merely signal (as opposed to 
cause) an incipient slowdown.  It is notable, however, that shocks to standards still affect lending 
and output in extended VAR models that control for recent macroeconomic conditions and firm 
and bank financial health.  Standard are also significant in structural inventory investment 17
equations, where the role of standards is  (arguably) identified with changes in the 
supply of credit. 
We found feedback from loans to standards, suggesting a sort of credit cycle.  Higher 
loan levels cause tightening standards, perhaps because lenders conclude (or are told by 
supervisors) that standards are too loose.  Tighter standards are followed by lower spending and 
loan levels, which eventually cause easing standards and higher spending and loan levels . . ad
infinitum.
Some of the negative findings here are also interesting.  Shocks to the federal funds rate 
do not cause changes in standards, lenders simply raise loan rates more or less in step with the 
funds rate.  While this finding seems counter to theories of a narrow bank lending channel of 
monetary policy, at least via changes in standards, further research using alternative monetary 
policy measures may yet uncover a standards channel.      We found a negative relationship 
between banks’ capital ratios and their lending via standards but that link between bank capital 
and lending standards was statistically weak.  We view this more as a problem with book capital 
measures than with theories of capital constraints on banks.  The federal funds rate falls in 
response to positive shocks in credit standards, suggesting that monetary policymakers follow a 
“lean-against-the-lenders” strategy. References 
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Horizon quarters Real GDP Fed. Funds C&I Loans Standards
1 100 0 0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0)
28 8 2 2 6
(5.4) (2.0) (2.5) (3.1)
37 2 3 3 2 1
(7.7) (1.8) (3.5) (6.0)
45 7 3 3 3 1
(9.2) (3.1) (3.8) (7.5)
82 4 1 9 1 3 1
(9.3) (8.5) (3.6) (8.8)
12 14 21 1 23
(7.8) (9.7) (3.4) (9.3)
Horizon quarters Real GDP Fed. Funds C&I Loans Standards
1 5 14 73 0
(4.1) (6.6) (8.2) (0)
2 4 86 65
(4.0) (5.4) (9.7) (2.8)
36 5 5 5 1 5
(5.4) (5.0) (10.4) (6.0)
49 5 4 3 2 5
(7.0) (5.2) (10.4) (8.6)
8 1 731 6 5 2
(9.9) (4.2) (8.6) (12.7)
12 14 2 9 66
(10.0) (3.3) (8.0) (13.9)
Horizon quarters Real GDP Fed. Funds C&I Loans Standards
11 1 1 9 5
(2.9) (2.9) (3.3) (4.9)
21 1 1 5 7 7
(2.7) (2.6) (7.8) (7.9)
31 1 2 0 6 6
(3.0) (2.6) (8.9) (8.8)
41 1 2 1 6 3
(3.4) (2.9) (8.9) (8.5)
83 2 2 0 6 0
(4.1) (3.4) (7.9) (8.3)
12 5 2 18 58
(3.6) (3.8) (7.4) (9.4)
Horizon quarters Real GDP Fed. Funds C&I Loans Standards
16 9 0 0 0
(4.8) (6.0) (0) (0)
21 5 6 6 0 0
(7.5) (8.7) (0.6) (0.7)
32 5 4 7 0 2
(9.8) (9.2) (1.3) (2.4)
42 6 3 6 0 1 1
(10.6) (8.3) (1.5) (5.1)
82 5 2 5 0 1 4
(11.6) (8.0) (2.5) (7.3)
12 23 21 1 16
(11.2) (7.9) (4.1) (9.2)
Each panel reports the decomposition of the variance of the forecast error of the series in the panel heading.  Figures
within panel are the share (%) of the variance at each horizon attributable to the variable in each column.  Credit
standards enters last in the VAR.  See table 1 for VAR model description.  Decompositions of commodity prices and
deflator and their contributions are not reported.  Standard errors in parenthesis
Table 2: Variance Decompositions


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Variance Decompositions from Extended VARs
I. VAR with Business Failure Rate
A. Percentage of GDP variance attributed to shocks to:
Horizon quarters Real GDP  Fed. Funds C&I Loans Business Failures Standards
1 100 0 0 0 0
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
2 8 8 3 304
(6.0) (2.8) (3.1) (1.1) (3.2)
37 6 3 3 1 1 2
(8.5) (2.2) (4.0) (2.1) (6.3)
46 1 3 3 4 1 5
(9.7) (3.2) (4.3) (3.8) (7.4)
82 5 2 3 2 1 2 7
(7.5) (8.9) (3.4) (6.2) (5.1)
12 17 24 1 11 3
(8.2) (10.3) (3.5) (7.2) (4.2)
B.  Percentage of loan variance attributed to shocks to:
Horizon quarters Real GDP  Fed. Funds C&I Loans Business Failures Standards
1 6 14 70 0 0
(5.0) (6.0) (7.8) (0.0) (0.0)
25 8 6 4 0 4
(4.9) (5.0) (9.1) (0.5) (2.7)
3 6 7 5 501 2
(6.1) (5.1) (10.4) (1.0) (5.9)
4 7 7 4 501 8
(7.4) (5.8) (11.1) (1.4) (8.1)
8 1 371 9 9 2 8
(10.3) (6.5) (9.9) (7.5) (11.2)
12 9 4 12 25 25
(9.0) (5.7) (8.5) (12.8) (12.3)
C.  Percentage of standards variance attributed to shocks to:
Horizon quarters Real GDP  Fed. Funds C&I Loans Business Failures Standards
1 011 0 9 8
(1.7) (2.0) (2.2) (1.7) (4.5)
2 1 0 2 326 5
(2.8) (1.9) (7.6) (2.6) (7.9)
3 1 1 2 565 0
(3.0) (2.4) (8.1) (4.1) (7.6)
4 1 1 2 494 7
(3.3) (2.6) (7.9) (4.8) (7.6)
8 6 3 2 184 4
(5.3) (3.6) (7.1) (4.4) (7.5)
12 6 3 18 10 39
(5.2) (3.8) (6.4) (4.7) (7.3)
Reported in each panel is the decomposition of the variance of the forecast error of the series in the panel 
heading.   Each cell within a panel reports the percentage of the variance at each horizon attributable to 
shocks in the variable in each column. 25
III. VAR With C&I Loan Rate
A. Percentage of GDP variance attributed to shocks to:
Horizon quarters Real GDP Fed. Funds C&I Loans  Loan rate Standards
1 100 0 0 0 0
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
2 8 9 2 215
(5.7) (2.0) (2.5) (1.9) (3.4)
37 4 3 2 1 1 8
(8.5) (2.0) (3.1) (2.4) (6.9)
46 1 5 2 1 2 6
(10.2) (3.5) (3.5) (2.2) (8.5)
82 6 1 7 1 2 2 7
(8.6) (7.0) (4.0) (4.3) (9.7)
12 14 15 1 1 25
(7.0) (7.3) (4.5) (4.2) (11.2)
B.  Percentage of loan variance attributed to shocks to:
Horizon quarters Real GDP Fed. Funds C&I Loans LoanRate Standards
13 7 8 1 0 0
(3.7) (4.6) (7.1) (0.0) (0.0)
23 4 6 7 3 5
(4.0) (3.6) (8.3) (2.0) (2.5)
35 2 5 6 3 1 5
(5.4) (2.8) (9.5) (2.6) (6.2)
49 2 4 4 2 2 4
(7.2) (2.8) (10.0) (2.9) (8.9)
82 0 1 1 7 1 4 5
(11.3) (2.1) (8.4) (3.2) (13.5)
12 19 1 9 2 56
(12.1) (3.1) (6.6) (4.8) (15.3)
C.  Percentage of standards variance attributed to shocks to:
Horizon quarters Real GDP Fed. Funds C&I Loans Loan rate Standards
12 3 1 2 9 3
(3.0) (3.2) (2.3) (2.7) (5.6)
21 2 1 5 2 7 4
(2.9) (2.8) (7.0) (2.5) (8.1)
31 2 2 1 2 6 2
(2.9) (2.8) (8.3) (2.9) (8.9)
41 2 2 2 2 6 0
(3.2) (2.8) (8.2) (3.0) (8.6)
84 3 2 1 5 5 3
(4.3) (2.8) (7.3) (4.5) (8.4)
12 4 3 19 5 51
(4.3) (2.9) (6.7) (4.3) (8.6)26
II. VAR With Bank Capital/Asset
A. Percentage of GDP variance attributed to shocks to:
Horizon quarters Real GDP  Fed. Funds C&I Loans Capital/Asset Ratio Standards
1 1 0 0 0 000
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
2 8 8 2 206
(5.7) (2.7) (2.4) (1.0) (3.4)
37 2 2 2 1 1 9
(8.2) (1.9) (3.3) (2.3) (6.7)
45 7 3 2 1 3 0
(9.5) (2.7) (3.6) (2.4) (8.6)
82 7 1 7 1 0 3 2
(7.8) (8.7) (3.3) (3.6) (10.2)
12 17 19 1 2 22
(7.1) (10.0) (3.9) (5.4) (10.5)
B.  Percentage of loan variance attributed to shocks to:
Horizon quarters Real GDP  Fed. Funds C&I Loans Capital/Asset Ratio Standards
13 1 4 7 4 0 0
(4.2) (5.9) (7.6) (0.0) (0.0)
24 8 6 4 1 5
(4.4) (4.7) (8.6) (1.2) (2.8)
37 5 4 9 4 1 5
(6.0) (4.4) (9.6) (3.5) (5.9)
41 0 5 3 5 5 2 6
(7.6) (4.8) (9.3) (4.8) (8.2)
81 8 4 1 0 5 4 9
(10.4) (5.1) (6.3) (6.6) (12.3)
12 14 3 6 3 63
(10.2) (4.9) (6.1) (6.7) (14.4)
C.  Percentage of standards variance attributed to shocks to:
Horizon quarters Real GDP  Fed. Funds C&I Loans Capital/Asset Ratio Standards
12 1 2 2 9 3
(3.3) (2.1) (2.5) (2.7) (5.5)
22 1 1 6 1 7 6
(2.7) (2.0) (7.1) (2.3) (7.8)
31 1 2 0 1 6 6
(2.9) (2.5) (8.0) (2.4) (8.2)
41 1 2 0 1 6 4
(3.3) (2.6) (7.8) (3.0) (7.9)
86 2 1 6 8 5 7
(4.3) (2.9) (6.6) (5.7) (7.3)
12 5 2 15 7 56
(4.1) (3.1) (5.9) (5.4) (7.9)27
.
Reported are regression coefficients (standard errors).  
Dependent variable is inventory investment of type indicated.
C -0.10 -0.09 -0.13 -0.11 -0.06* -0.06*
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
0.15* 0.14 0.20** 0.16* 0.10** 0.11**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04)
ƒ´ I t- 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.45** 0.50**
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
0.33** 0.31** 0.12 0.15* 0.12** 0.11**
(0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03)
-0.06 0.18 -0.04 0.11 -0.12 -0.12
(0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.10) (0.08)
1.01 0.73 0.68 0.76 0.48 0.56*
(0.55) (0.56) (0.52) (0.48) (0.27) (0.26)
-0.08* --- -0.07* --- 0.01 ---
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
-0.03 --- 0.04 --- 0.02 ---
(0.05) (0.04) (0.02)
0.24 0.12 0.20 0.16 0.58 0.57
P-value --- 0.02 --- 0.06 --- 0.16
The dependent variable is the growth rate of the respective inventory category.  I and S denote the 
logarithm of the inventory and sales category respectively.  Real is the level of the Prime Rate less 
the one-year inflation rate.  Standards is the level of loan standards.  The equations are estimated 
using instrumental variables with (St-1-It-1), Realt-1, Standardst-1, ?It-1, ?St-1, ?Realt-1, ?Standardst-1 
as instruments.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, and ** indicate significance at the 5 and 1 
percent levels, respectively.
Table 6:  Structural Inventory Investment Regression Equations with Credit 
Standards
Retail Wholesale Manufacturing
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